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Abstract
In the realm of self-assessment, overconfidence is the default. Overconfidence helps in-
dividuals reach higher status within social groups by making them seem more competent to
others regardless of their objective ability. For this reason, the widespread self-serving bias
may be especially prevalent within elite communities, particularly among their most status-
oriented members. Based on this premise, we explore the possibility that lobbyists in the U.S.
misperceive and exaggerate their success. Using models that 1) control for legislative out-
come when predicting self-assessed policy success, and 2) compare the self-assessed policy
success of lobbyists on specific proposals against the average success reported by all lobbyists
working on the same side of an issue, we identify systematic tendencies to overrate lobbyists’
own achievements. Lobbyists who earn more money, reside in Washington, D.C., have con-
gressional experience, and engage in a broader range of activities are more likely than other
lobbyists to inflate their success relative to other lobbyists. Public interest group lobbyists tend
to underestimate their policy success. We conclude that political elites are victim to the same
biases as others when evaluating self and performance, and these biases may be largely status-
driven.
Keywords: interest groups, elites, lobbying, overconfidence, policy influence, measure-
ment, misperception
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Credit-claiming is such a natural part of politics that governmental institutions are likely built
around it (Mayhew, 1974). Yet, claiming success is not the same thing as achieving the success one
claims. Multiple meta-analyses across different domains show that self-assessment is often poorly
correlatedwith objectivemeasures of outcome success (Davis et al., 2006; Falchikov&Boud, 1989;
Mabe & West, 1982). The phenomenon of overconfidence1 may be even more prevalent in elite
occupations (Baekgaard, Christensen, Dahlmann, Mathiasen, & Petersen, 2017), where people are
highly motivated to present themselves as successful (Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012).
One broader concern, especially in our current political environment, is how claiming undeserved
credit may ultimately reduce elite accountability to the public (Cruz & Schneider, 2017).
Elite over-estimates of success may further obscure our view of certain political activities, like
lobbying, where demonstrating unambiguous effects is notoriously difficult. Estimates of return on
investment in lobbying remain imprecise (Hill, Kelly, Lockhart, &VanNess, 2013; Kim, 2008), and
we have do not have a clear understanding of what ultimately makes lobbyists successful or effective
(Bernhagen, Dür, & Marshall, 2014; McKay, 2012; Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Baumgartner,
Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, & Kimball, 2009; Baron, 2006). Given measurement difficulties, one
approach to assessing the success of lobbyists is simply to ask them (Egdell & Thomson, 1999;
Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, & Salisbury, 1993). In view of the tendency toward overconfidence and
inflated self-assessment, this approach presents both problem and opportunity. The problem is
straightforward—self-assessment estimates of lobbyist success may be biased. The opportunities
are more subtle, but important nonetheless. If self-assessments are biased, are there systematic
differences in these biases? If so, what can we learn about elite behavior by examining systematic
differences?
Drawing on literature from psychology, we seek to describe and potentially help account for the
prevalence of lobbyists’ overconfidence. The psychology literature contains numerous examples
1We employ overconfidence to suggest that overconfident individuals are not as good at a task as they believe
themselves to be (or say they are). Because our study examines postdiction, or self-assessments of prior performance,
it may be more accurate to refer to this phenomenon as a self-serving bias in attribution of outcomes. For the sake of
succinctness, however, we use the term overconfidence throughout, as seen in prior studies of postdiction (Finn, 2008;
Nevid, Cheney, & Thompson, 2015; Weinstein & Roediger, 2010)
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of attribution bias, and more specifically, motivated overconfidence, that can help better explain
this phenomenon (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004). Glenberg, Wilkinson, and Epstein (1982) de-
scribe overconfidence as the illusion of knowing. There is a real and quantifiable difference between
humans’ perceptions of having successfully completed a task and actually completing a task suc-
cessfully. Moreover, some individuals are more likely than others to overrate their own performance
(Anderson et al., 2012). We examine the literature in greater detail and examine which individual
differences might predict overconfidence in lobbying success.
Defining overconfidence
In this study, we look at two key outcomes: the divergence between lobbyists’ self-assessed suc-
cess on a wide variety of policy proposals and their actual legislative outcomes, and the difference
between the self-assessment and the relative perceived success of other lobbyists working toward
the same policy outcome. What we examine is not perfectly aligned to many operationalizations
of overconfidence within the psychology literature, but fits within the same family of ego-centric
bias. The consistent element across all operationalizations is that overconfident people think they,
or certain attributes of themselves or their behavior, are better than what they really are (Moore &
Healy, 2008).
The most common form of overconfidence examined in the research literature is overestimation
— “of one’s actual ability, performance, level of control, or chance of success,” (Moore & Healy,
2008). While our outcomes of interest are conceptually in accord with this form, our measurement
approach differs. In lab-based studies, overconfidence is typically measured by people’s assess-
ments of their performance (when they did not know their actual performance) relative to their
actual performance. Our measurement focuses on self-assessments of lobbyists’ contributions to a
known policy outcome. We believe this phenomenon can be fit under the broad umbrella of over-
confidence as it describes lobbyists who think they are better at their jobs than evidence would
suggest.
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Sources of overconfidence
Individuals tend to overestimate their own success and ability (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Dunning
et al., 2004), and are overconfident in their abilities in the workplace (Haun, Zeringue, & Foley,
2000). This tendency is problematic considering the utility of accurate self-perception in assessing
one’s goals (Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003), one’s choice of projects (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999), or
the strategies most likely to lead to success (Neale & Bazerman, 1985).
While there is some evidence that epistemic communities may be more accurate than others
in their self-assessment ratings (Dunning, 2011), lobbyists also have a professional incentive for
being perceived as important or integral to the final outcome. A contract lobbyist makes pitches
to prospective clients based on her relationships, skills, access, and past successes. An in-house
lobbyist secures job recognition and promotion based on his successes. Trade associations, unions,
and citizen groups tout policy successes in their efforts to attract and renew dues-paying members.
For lobbyists and the groups they represent, admitting failure may threaten their livelihood more
than failure itself. (Of course, inflating success is not the only possible response to these pressures.
Lobbyists may formulate differing definitions of success (Leech, 2010) or shift to more favorable
criteria in how they evaluate themselves.)
Scholars have offered three possible accounts for why overconfidence is so widespread. The
first suggests that psychological benefits, such as enhanced self-esteem (Alicke, 1985), motivate
overconfidence (Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995; Kunda, 1987). The second account
holds that cognitive biases preclude accurate self-judgments. Individuals may be unable to eval-
uate themselves fairly due to basic processes of judgment. For instance, biased estimates of prior
performance may appear because individuals are more likely to have intended to succeed in the first
place (Miller & Ross, 1975), because they lack adequate meta-knowledge (Russo & Schoemaker,
1992) needed to understand their competence (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), or because individuals
characterize success in different ways (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). Additionally,
people may have trouble adjusting assessments of performance after they receive feedback (Ross,
Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975).
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However, a compelling third account of overconfidence has recently emerged. This growing
line of research posits that overconfidence is widespread due to its ability to confer social (rather
than psychological) benefits (Anderson et al., 2012; Kennedy, Anderson, &Moore, 2013). Viewing
themselves with unwarranted positivity can help individuals persuade others to likewise perceive
them as more competent. This view of overconfidence holds that individuals are motivated by
desire for external social status — importance, power, and respect among peers — in addition
to internal benefits. Social status, particularly in elite careers such as lobbying, provides access
to greater professional and personal resources. Anderson et al. (2012) show that overconfidence
helps individuals reach higher status within social groups by making them seem more competent
to others regardless of their objective ability. Further, the authors find that desire for status predicts
greater overconfidence. Follow-up work shows that individuals are not punished by others when
revealed to be overconfident, suggesting that the benefits outweigh any social costs (Kennedy et al.,
2013).
The above literature suggests two key sources of overconfidence: personal characteristics and
professional activities. Regarding personal traits, the literature suggests a reciprocal relationship
between status and perception: overconfident individuals are more likely to attain an elevated stand-
ing, and higher standing tends to produce greater overconfidence (Anderson et al., 2012). Likewise,
it may then be the case that those without status markers are less likely to be overconfident (Josephs,
Sellers, Newman, & Mehta, 2006).
Research on identity suggests that certain personal characteristics may lead to greater overesti-
mation of success. If a component of one’s self-concept is salient, an individual often takes on the
relevant stereotype (D’Acunto, 2015). For example, because the stereotypes of those who reside in
Washington D.C. (LaPira & Thomas, 2017), and those with high incomes (Johannesen-Schmidt &
Eagly, 2002) are successful, individuals holding these stations may be more overconfident about
their professional success. Our first hypothesis, then, is that lobbyists of higher status will tend to
be more overconfident.
Regarding professional activities, various activities lobbyists can undertake in the job, such as
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fundraising, contacting federal agencies, and trying to sway public opinion may contribute further
to feelings of efficacy. For instance, activities that involve less accurate or less timely feedback
may lead to greater overconfidence (Lazear, 2016; Russo & Schoemaker, 1992). Because indi-
viduals who have examples of effortful and varied activities cognitively available to them may be
more likely to associate their activities with success (Ross & Sicoly, 1979), lobbyists who have
more effortful and varied examples of their own lobbying activities cognitively available may be
more likely to overrate their own success. A similar effect is described in management research, as
seen in the worker who conflates busyness with performance (Williamson & Johnston, 1988). An
enlarged job description may also instill feelings of efficacy (Parker, 1998), which in turn inflates
perceived influence on the policy process. Our second hypothesis, then, that engaging in lobbying
activities that extend beyond the basic function of contacting Members of Congress tends to lead
such lobbyists to be overconfident.
Research Design
We evaluate overconfidence in two different ways, by 1) examining both a lobbyist’s subjective rat-
ing of his or her success while controlling for legislative outcome, and by 2) comparing a lobbyist’s
subjective rating of his or her success with the those ratings of all lobbyists working on the same
side of the issue. In other words, one measure examines whether a lobbyist’s perception of his suc-
cess is in line with whether the sought outcomes were achieved (irrespective of how others on the
same side of issue rate their own success) and the other measure examines if a lobbyist’s perception
of success is in line with others who worked on the same side (irrespective of coding for outcomes).
We test our theory using data from interviews with 776 lobbyists2 conducted by Heinz, Lau-
mann, Nelson and Salisbury (1993) supplemented with our own research on the 77 policy proposals
about which the investigators queried lobbyists. The Heinz, et al. (1993) project, known as the ba-
sis for the Hollow Core book, was funded by the American Bar Foundation and National Science
2These lobbyists were 87% male, with an average age of 46.14, SD = 11.31.
6
Foundation and uses the largest sample of lobbyists ever interviewed or surveyed by scholars. In
particular we are interested in the lobbyists’ actions and views on up to five policy proposals each.
Lobbyists were given a list, developed from news stories, of 22 prominent policy proposals in
each of four policy domains—agriculture, health, energy, or labor—for a total of 77 proposals (some
issues crossed multiple domains). The subjects were asked to identify up to five issues on which
they worked closely. Respondents were asked their client or organization’s position (for, against,
or ambivalent/no position), and what actions they took (identifying the issue, contacting Congress,
contacting federal agencies, appealing to public opinion). Most importantly for our purposes, on
each of these five issues lobbyists were also asked, “Given your client/organization’s objectives,
would you say your client/organization achieved all, most, about half, few, or none of its objectives?”
The authors called this their success measure and used it to draw conclusions about the “success”
of different kinds of lobbyists and groups.3 We depart from Heinz et al. (1993) by labeling this
measure perceived success, for reasons we discuss in the next section.
Dependent Variables: Perceived Success and Relative Perceived Success
In the analyses that follow, we examine two dependent variables, perceived success and relative
perceived success. Perceived success is a five-point ordered measure of the portion of the lobbyist’s
objectives that the lobbyist says he or she achieved on a particular policy proposal, ranging from
“none” to “all” (M = 3.23, SD = 1.42) (Heinz et al., 1993). In addition to using this measure directly
as a dependent variable, we also use it to construct the relative perceived success variable.
To gauge the lobbyist’s sense of his or her relative success, we use the perceived success score
and subtract the average reported success level achieved by all lobbyists advocating on the same
side of the issue. The resulting variable, relative perceived success, varies from -3.75 to 3.27, and
we standardize it by shifting it upward (by 3.75) to make all responses positive and then dividing by
the range (7.02) to produce a variable bounded by 0 and 1 (M = 0.53, SD = 0.16). High values of
3Specifically, Heinz et al. (1993, p. 349) found that lobbyists with more years in government, lobbyists who
represented trade associations, lobbyists who knew more “notable” lobbyists, and economic liberals were more likely
to say they had achieved more of their client or organization’s objectives. (The square of years in government had a
negative effect on perceived success, however.)
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relative perceived success indicate that the lobbyist thinks his or her client/organization was much
more successful than other organizations whose lobbyists worked on the same side of the issue, and
low values indicate the lobbyist reported less success than others on the same side of the issue.
Explanatory Variables and Hypotheses
We examine two possible sources of overconfidence—lobbyist activities (elements of what they
do, such as distributing PAC contributions, contacting a federal agency, or trying to sway public
opinion) and lobbyist traits (elements of who they are, such as their income, the type of group they
work for, and whether they live in or near Washington, D.C.).
Legislative outcome
To measure overestimates of success and the correlates of overconfidence, we first need to ef-
fectively control for legislative outcome. When perceived success is the dependent variable, we do
this by including measures of the success or failure of the lobbyist in securing the sought outcome.
We include two dummy variables—Outcome: Success (M = .42, SD = .49) and Outcome: Fail-
ure (M = .35, SD = .48)—that allow us to account for what happened in the legislative process.
The omitted category contains cases in which the lobbyist would not say definitively whether their
client/organization was for or against the proposal (including “neither,” “both,” and “it depends”;
21% of cases), because without a definitive answer of which side of an issue the lobbyist was on,
we cannot evaluate if they were successful or not.
Admittedly, success is a difficult concept to measure, especially when it comes to public policy
(Burstein, 2014). In our coding we adhered strictly to the wording of the proposal given to lobbyists
and government officials by Heinz et al. (1993). This language often provides the outcome (e.g.,
“House approves HR 4962, upgrading and expanding CHAP-Child Health Assurance Program”) or
at least the bill number or agency working on it, along with the month and year. We used the annual
Congressional Quarterly (CQ) Almanac to identify whether the proposal, as it was proposed in the
month and year given, had become law by the time of the interviews. Those proposals that did not
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go far enough or were not major enough to be discussed in the CQ Almanac were researched in
newspapers archived by Lexis-Nexis or in scholarly papers. A full list of these proposals, along
with our coding of outcome and justification of this coding, appear in the appendix.
Table 1 provides prima facie evidence that these variables successfully capture the role played
by outcomes in self-assessments (though it also suggests that there is additional variance to be
explained above and beyond success).
This analysis of outcomes also helps validate our second dependent variable, relative perceived
success. Given that legislative outcomes are associated with self-evaluations (r = .37), examining
the distance between an individual lobbyist’s self-evaluation and the average self-evaluation rating
of all other legislators on the same side of the issue allows us to examine which lobbyists see
themselves as better (or worse) than consensus opinion.
Table 1: Lobbyist Self-Perceived Success, by Legislative Outcome
Legislative outcome
Self-perceived success Preferred outcome: Preferred outcome: Other
realized (42%) not realized (35%) (23%)
None 7% 28% 15%
Few 10% 24% 23%
Half 14% 16% 28%
Most 33% 16% 21%
All 36% 16% 12%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Notes: N = 3,251. Cell entries are percent in each self assessment category across legislative outcome. The Other
category contains cases in which the lobbyist would not say definitively whether their client/organization was for or
against the proposal.
Lobbyist activities
We now turn to factors that explain self-assessment after controlling for legislative outcome.
First we consider the activities lobbyists engage in as they pursue policy goals. Lobbyists who
choose their own issue have an extra stake in being seen as successful, and are personally invested
in the outcome. Further, because lobbyists who have examples of effortful and varied activities
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cognitively available to them may be more likely to associate their activities with success, we sus-
pect that lobbyists who employ tactics beyond contacting Congress, such as contacting an agency,4
may tend to overrate their success. The same logic, that going “above and beyond” results in better
perceived outcomes, also applies to engaging public opinion and engaging in fundraising and PAC
decision-making.
Identifying the issue for one’s employer (M = .64, SD = .48), contacting agencies (M = .46, SD =
.50), and appealing to public opinion (M = .40, SD = .49) were measured dichotomously. Fundrais-
ing was measured on a 5-point scale, from “never” to “regularly.” We also employ a dichotomous
measure for whether a lobbyist said that he or she participated in a PAC’s decision-making (M =
.40, SD = .49).
Lobbyist characteristics
Our theory that status considerations affect self-assessed success ratings among lobbyists sug-
gests that some lobbyists consider themselves more successful than others. For this reason, we
expect that lobbyists with higher annual incomes tend to exhibit overconfidence. Similarly, we
speculate that those who have worked in Congress believe they have experience and connections
that allow them to get more and longer meetings with key Capitol Hill personnel and to be more
persuasive in those meetings. Likewise, lobbyists who live in the Washington, D.C., area are likely
to see themselves as more central to federal policy-making, and if so, this may increase both psy-
chological and social demands to inflate perceptions of their success. (We know D.C. lobbyists
spend more time on federal policy: 55% of those residing in D.C. spent more than half their time
on federal government policy, whereas only 10% of those residing outside of D.C spent more than
50% of their time on federal policy). Similarly, lobbyists were asked to place themselves along a
five-point scale between these two extremes: “My work is so highly specialized that it demands I
concentrate on one issue,” or “My work is such that I can handle a range of issues in my field.” The
social benefits of overconfidence are likely to be particularly helpful for generalists, especially if
4We consider contacting an agency an additional strategy, rather than a substitute strategy, because 87 percent of
the lobbyists that contact an agency also contact Congress.
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“contacting the right person” is central to the story of their process expertise.
Conversely, we believe those working for public interest groups tend to underrate their suc-
cess. The objectives of public interest groups—saving the environment, ending hunger, equality
for women—may naturally be more difficult to achieve than the goals of other lobbyists, such as
increasing the allowable chickens per hour an inspector may legally inspect. Perhaps more impor-
tantly in our analysis of overconfidence, though, related to strategies for mustering support from
members and donors, public interest groups frequently emphasize a position of outsiders taking
on powerful opponents in bed with government (Walker, 1991).5 Lobbyists working for these or-
ganisations may internalize an underdog identity, which would bias their perception of their own
efficacy against too much success.6 Likewise, public interest lobbying is considered by many to
be a lower-status job in Washington. If our theory is correct that status is an important part of
self-evaluation of success, then those with these lower-status, “underdog” jobs should exhibit less
overconfidence than others.
The variables for Washington residence (M = .67, SD = .47), congressional experience (M =
.17, SD = .38), and public interest group status (M = .19, SD = .39) are measured dichotomously.
The level of specialization is measured on a 5-point scale, where higher values represent more
generalized practice (M = 4.00, SD = 1.11). Income was originally measured on a 20-point scale
(M = 8.82, SD = 3.85), ranging from under $10,000 to over $500,000. (We recode each respondent
to the midpoint of their answer category to create a linear scale for income, which we then rescale
0-1 to aid comparison against other variables. Results are consistent with alternative codings of
income.) All explanatory variables are recoded to range from 0-1 for ease of comparison.
5To the extent that public interest groups are disproportionately membership based organizations, this is also broadly
consistent with Jordan and Maloney (1998) and their focus on the importance of “supply side” activities tapping and
creating interest group compatible dispositions.
6We thank an anonymous review for making this point about public interest groups and suggesting the Walker
(1991) and Jordan and Maloney (1998) citations.
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Analysis
We fitted a series of ordered logit (perceived success) and OLS (relative perceived success) regres-
sion models to assess our hypotheses.7 We used an alpha level of .05 for all statistical tests. The
unit of analysis is the lobbyist-issue. We first present separate models for lobbyists activities and
activities, and then estimate an additional model that includes both sets of predictors. The average
lobbyist discussed 4.1 issues, and with 776 lobbyists, the maximum possible sample size is 3,212
(all models presented have fewer than this because of missing data).
Lobbyists’ activities and traits both contribute to distorted perceptions of lobbyists’ success.
Table 2 presents our perceived success model. As we would expect from the results presented pre-
viously above in Table 1, the regression results in model 1 in Table 2 clearly show that legislative
outcome is predictive of self-assessment. However, as the additional models show, what the lob-
byist claims to do and who they are are also important to how respondents rate their success. The
activities model shows that lobbyists who engaged in a broader range of activities on an issue re-
port greater success. Lobbyists who contacted a federal agency (usually in addition to contacting
Congress) and those who identified the issue for their client reported greater success. However,
those who appealed to public opinion, engaged in fundraising, or participated in PAC decisions did
not perceive themselves to be more successful.
The results regarding lobbyist characteristics are even more telling. As expected, higher income
is associated with greater perceptions of success. In addition to higher income earners, lobbyists
who have experience working in Congress and lobbyists who live in the D.C. area are also more
likely to rate their own success higher. The level of speciality also seems to matter — being a
generalist is associated with greater self-perceived success. Finally, those who work for public
interest groups rate their success lower than other lobbyists.8
7Data distribution was assumed to be normal but this was not formally tested. See Figure A1 in the appendix.
8As an additional means of testing the robustness of these results, we consider what happens when the lobbyist
reports that his client or organization achieved all of its objectives (perceived success = 5 on the 5-point scale), even
though the lobbyist’s stated preference is the opposite of the legislative outcome (7.4 percent of our sample). Using
logistic regression (Appendix Table A1), we find that extreme overconfidence is predicted by higher income, having
appealed to public opinion on the issue, and living in Washington, D.C. Likewise, underconfidence occurs when per-
ceived success = 0 and yet the lobbyist’s preferred outcome is realized (3.9 percent of our sample). We find that extreme
12
Table 2: Lobbyists’ Self-Perceived Success, by Legislative Outcome, Activities, and Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Activities Traits All
Preferred outcome: realized 1.19*** 1.11*** 1.19*** 1.12***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Preferred outcome: not realized -0.32*** -0.41*** -0.34*** -0.40***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Identify issue 0.23** 0.19*
(0.08) (0.08)
Contact agency 0.33*** 0.25**
(0.08) (0.08)
Influence public opinion 0.06 0.08
(0.08) (0.08)
Fundraise 0.10 0.05
(0.13) (0.13)
PAC decisions 0.17 0.09
(0.09) (0.09)
Income 0.94** 0.85**
(0.29) (0.29)
Congressional experience 0.23* 0.21*
(0.10) (0.10)
Generalized practice 0.38** 0.35*
(0.14) (0.14)
Lives DC area 0.23** 0.17*
(0.08) (0.08)
Public interest group -0.39*** -0.31**
(0.10) (0.10)
MacFadden’s Pseudo-R2 .05 .05 .05 .06
N 2898 2882 2687 2677
* p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. Ordered logit models clustered by respondent. Dependent variable isPerceived
success. All variables measured on 0-1 scale.
Logit coefficients are difficult to interpret directly. To ease interpretation of these results and to
get a better sense of the magnitude of effects, we present some predicted probabilities across key
independent variables of interest (holding all other variables at their means). The outcome we are
underconfidence is negatively correlated with income and with congressional experience.
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examining is the predicted probability of a lobbyist answering the perceived success question either
as having met either “most” or “all” of their goals. For lobbyists who did not realize their preferred
outcome, this quantity is 31%, but this increases by 36 percentage points, to 66%, for those who
did9. While the effects of other variables are smaller, they are still notable. For example, going from
the 66th percentile to the 99th percentile of income results in an increase of 15 percentage points.
Lobbyists who have the most generalized practice (compared to those who the most specialized
practice) are 8 percentage more likely to report having met at least “most” of their goals. Lobbyists
in who live in the DC area and lobbyists with Congressional experience are each 5% more likely to
report having met “all” or “most” of their goals. Finally, the effect of being a public interest lobbyist
is negative – they are 11% less likely to say they have met “all” or “most” of their goals.
Next, as an alternative modelling strategy, we model the relative perceived success of a lobbyist.
As described above, we calculate the difference between an individual lobbyist’s self-assessment
and the mean self-assessment for all lobbyists working on the same side of the issue. These results,
presented in Table ??, show that the same predictors are associated with overconfidence—the ac-
tivities of identifying the issue and contacting agencies, and the personal characteristics of income,
congressional experience, Washington residence, more generalized practice, and public interest
group status.10
Finally, to further ascertain that these findings demonstrate systematic overconfidence rather
than accurate self-assessment, we checked whether our legislative outcome variables are associ-
ated with the same lobbyist activities and characteristics as our measures of overconfidence. We
did so by conducting a multivaraiate probit regression (a form of Seemingly Unrelated Regression
that accounts for correlated outcome measures) for the success and failure outcomes. Only contact-
ing agencies positively predicts both relative perceived success and preferred legislative outcome
realization. Moreover, two variables are significant in the opposite direction for preferred legisla-
tive outcome realization than they are for relative perceived success: public interest group status
9Rounding accounts for the small discrepancy here.
10As further robustness checks for the primary relative perceived success model, we also considered alternative
modeling tactics, including using tobit (which enforces upper and lower bounds on the dependent variable) rather than
OLS and using fixed effects for the issue or group. Our results are robust to these alternative modelling strategies.
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Table 3: Lobbyists’ Relative Perceived Success, by Activities and Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Activities Traits All
Identify issue 0.02** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Contact agency 0.03*** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Influence public opinion 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Fundraise 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
PAC decisions 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Income 0.06** 0.05*
(0.02) (0.02)
Congressional experience 0.02* 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01)
Lives DC area 0.02** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01)
Generalized practice 0.03* 0.03*
(0.01) (0.01)
Public interest group -0.03** -0.02*
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.42***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
R2 .02 .02 .03
N 2881 2686 2676
* p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. OLS models. Dependent variable is Relative perceived success. All variables
measured on 0-1 scale.
is negatively associated with actual failure, and living in D.C. is negatively associated with actual
success.11 These results are included in the appendix (Table A2). In sum, these analyses further
strengthen our interpretation that the results presented Tables 2 and 3 reflect sources of overconfi-
dence
11These results are robust to modeling the outcome on a 3-pt. scale with cases in which the lobbyist would not say
definitively whether their client/organization was for or against the proposal at the midpoint, using ordered logit.
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Conclusion
Lobbyists often overrate their ability to achieve goals for their clients or organizations. Moreover,
this tendency toward overconfidence can be reliably predicted by variables describing the lobbyist’s
traits and activities—and these same variables do not explain success when success is measured
objectively.
In particular, greater income for the lobbyist, having congressional experience, and living in
the Washington area are all associated with a tendency to report higher levels of success – either
directly or relative to other lobbyists working on the same side of the same issue. We think that
these variables describe individuals more likely to consider themselves an important part of the
policymaking process in Washington. In the other direction, we find that lobbyists working for
public interest groups are more likely to underrate their success, supporting the conclusion that
public interest lobbyists’ goals are more difficult to reach than those of private interest groups.
In this specific case of why income is positively associated with perceptions of success, there are
two possibilities. First, as would be consistent with our theoretical expectations, lobbyists simply
believe they are more successful because they earn more (which in turn provides social benefits that
aid the lobbyist’s quest for new clients and projects). Alternatively (and more charitably), lobbyists
might actually be more successful than those who earn less. However, the results discussed above
and presented in the appendix do not show a positive association between income and success.
A professional lobbyist might counter that his or her goals surrounding a particular policy pro-
posal extend beyond securing the preferred outcome: the lobbyist may be building relationships
over the long term (Leech, 2010), for example. But even in such cases, the number of people who
claim that they achieve all of their goals even when their preferred outcome does not occur is com-
pelling evidence that overconfidence is involved. It is also worth noting that self-assessments were
given in the context of academic research with the promise of anonymity, which should provide
less incentive to brag than would communication with clients, peers, or others in the lobbyist’s
professional orbit.
Research relying on interest groups’ own assessment of success may skew inferences if some
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lobbyists are systematically more likely than others to be overconfident. Accordingly, future work
should use measures of policy success that are not subject to attribution bias (Kruger & Dunning,
1999). Our measure of side success—the average perceived success of lobbyists working on the
same side of an issue—is a feasible and sensible alternative to individually self-perceived success
measures. It is more strongly correlated with our wholly exogenous measure of the actual policy
outcome (r = .63) than is the individual self-perceived success measure (r = .37). Such triangulation
is recommended as a way of addressing the thorny problem of measuring interest group influence
(Dür, 2008). Further, because side success is continuous, it better reflects the compromises and
achievements, short of full policy success, that very often describe policy outcomes (Mahoney,
2007; Baumgartner et al., 2009). Recently, more sophisticated methods of measuring interest group
success have been developed, especially using spatial methods (Klüver, 2013; Bernhagen et al.,
2014), but the data-gathering and analysis burden of these techniques is high.
In addition to the methodological contribution of this research, our findings add to our under-
standing of the psychology of political elites, which is under-studied relative to the influence of
political elites over national affairs. By comparing self-assessments against the views of others on
the same side of the issue, we see that self-serving bias is common, particularly among higher-status
elites. This conclusion joins initial work on elected officials and perceptual bias (Baekgaard et al.,
2017) in suggesting that political elites are just as susceptible, if not more so, to the same biases as
others when evaluating self and performance.
Our findings also contribute to a growing body of literature in which high social status is asso-
ciated with greater overconfidence (Anderson et al., 2012; D’Acunto, 2015; Josephs et al., 2006;
Kennedy et al., 2013). Overconfidence within epistemic communities may be especially likely
when these communities are geographically concentrated and many members are extremely well
paid. This conjecture should be examined more broadly. Specifically in lobbying, these possibili-
ties could be examined in communities such as American state capitals, other national capitals, and
the homes of international organizations and institutions (e.g., Brussels as home to the European
Union and NATO). In addition, these findings could easily extend beyond political domains to other
17
communities, such as finance (New York, London), medical specialties (e.g., Houston for cardiol-
ogy), and technology (Silicon Valley). We hope that future research will examine these questions
both within politics and in other fields.
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